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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. Nature of Case
Defendant-Appellant, Mr. Thomas Wolff Grohmann (Mr. Grohmann), appeals
from the District Court's Judgment (R., Vol. 2, pp. 337-38), granting recognition under
the Idaho Uniform Foreign Country Judgment Recognition Act, I.C. § 10-1401, et seq.,
to a Judgment entered November 3, 2006, but the Kammergericht Berlin, German Court
of Appeals, in favor of Plaintiff-Respondent Ron Markin (Mr. Markin) in the amount of
$1,213,175.50.
2. Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings.
Mr. Grohmann failed to pay a promisory noted to Mr. Markin. (R., Vol. 1, p. 184).
Mr. Markin, through his long time attorney Mr. Haber, filed suit against Mr. Grohmann,
and ultimately, entered into a stipulation with Mr. Grohmann for settlement and
payment. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 184-85). After failure to comply with that stipulation, judgment
was entered by the United States District Court for the Central District of California in
December, 2000. (R., Vol. 1, p. 201). That obligation remained unpaid, and therefore
Mr. Markin hired counsel to pursue Mr. Grohmann's property in Germany. (R., Vol. 1,
pp. 187-88). Judgment was then pursued and obtained in Germany. (R., Vol. 1, 'pp. 11-

31) That judgment, obtained after hearing and argument by both parties, is now final.
(R., Vol. 1, pp. 11-31)
A nationwide search finally located real estate in Idaho. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 186-89)

" condo had
Upon review of the facts by title inquiry, it was revealed that the E!!{horn
been owned at various times by Mr. Grohmann, and that transfers had been made
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between Mr. Grohmann and Mrs. Grohmann, and Aquastar, LLC, an entity formed by
Mr. Grohmann but owned now by Mr.s Grohmann. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 186-89).
In 2008, after finding Mr. Grohmann's property in Idaho, Mr. Markin sought to
have the German judgment recognized under the Idaho Uniform Foreign Country
Judgment Recognition Act, I.C. § 10-1401, et seq., and filed a Complaint for State
Recognition of Foreign Country Judgment. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 5-31).
Appellants moved for summary judgment, dismissal, and sanctions. (R., Vol. 1,
pp. 39-43). After hearing argument, including argument on Appellants' motion for
reconsideration, the District Court denied summary judgment as to Mr. Grohmann, and
determining that because Mr. Grohmann had failed to meet his burden under I.C. § 101404 to establish a mandatory or discretionary ground for the District Court not to
recognize the German judgment, therefore summary judgment would be entered in
favor of Mr. Markin, and the German judgment would therefore be recognized by the
State of Idaho. (R., Vol. 2, pp. 312-314, 323-25). Mr. Grohmann appealed (R., Vol. 2,
pp.327-36).

II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A.

Did the District Court properly grant recognition to the German judgment
herein pursuant to Idaho Uniform Foreign Country Judgment Recognition
Act,I.C. § 10-1401, etseq.?

B.

Whether either party is entitled to attorneys fees on appeal.
III. ARGUMENT

A Standard of Review
On appeal from a trial court, the Court of Appeals uses the same standard as the
District Court and therefore summary judgment is appropriate when the "pleadings,

?

depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, !)how that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c); Brown v. Caldwell School District No. 132,
127 Idaho 112, 898 P.2d 43 (1995).

The facts are to be construed in a Iig ht most

favorable to the nonmoving party. Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434, 436, 807
P.2d 1272 (1991). Generally, one who moves for summary judgment has a burden of
proving that there is no genuine issue of material fact, irrespective of whether he or his
opponent would, at the time of trial, have the burden of proof on the issue concerned.
McCoy

v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 769, 820 P.2d 360 (1991). "If the record contains

conflicting inferences or reasonable minds might reach different conclusions, a
summary judgment must be denied." Loomis, 119 Idaho at 436 (citations omitted). A
motion for summary judgment should not be granted unless the evidence as a whole
allows a reasonable person only one conclusion. Id. A motion for summary judgment
should be granted only where the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law, where it is clear what the truth is, and where not genuine issue remains for
adjudication. It is not the purpose of summary judgment to cut litigants off from their
right to adjudication when there are issues to be tried. Moss v. Mid-America Fire and
Marine Ins. Co., 103 Idaho 298, 647 P.2d 754 (1982). Even when the basic facts are

not disputed, summary judgment is inappropriate if these facts reasonably allow
conflicting inferences. Loomis, 119 Idaho at 436.
,

.,

Finally, where there is a genuine issue of credibility of eviden'ce", or where the
credibility of witnesses is at issue, summary judgment is inappropriate. Lowry v. Ireland
Bank, 116 Idaho 708, 779 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1989).

B. The District Court correctly granted recognition to the German judgment
herein pursuant to Idaho Uniform Foreign Country Judgment Recognition Act. I.C. § 101401, et seq.
Mr. Grohmann seeks to overturn the District Court's ruling denying summary
judgment in the above referenced case as against Mr. Grohmann and recognizing the
German judgment under Idaho las. In fact, the record as before the District Court
reveals that a valid German judgment exists which should be and was recognized
pursuant to the Idaho's Uniform Foreign Country Money Judgments Recognition Act,

I.C. 10-1401, et seq.
According to the Compiler's Notes in the pocket part to Michie's Idaho Code, the
current version of Idaho's Uniform Foreign Country Judgments Recognition Act took
effect on and after July 1, 2007, and applies to aI/ actions concerning the recognition of
a foreign country judgment. See, Compiler's Notes, Idaho Code § 10-1404.

Idaho Code § 10-1404 provides in pertinent part:
10-1404 STANDARDS FOR RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN COUNTRY
JUDGMENT.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (2) and, (3), of this
section, a court of this state shall recognize a foreign country judgment to
which this chapter applies. . . .
" .
(3) A court of this state need not recognize a foreign country
judgment if:
(a) The defendant in the proceeding in the foreign court did not
receive notice of the proceeding in sufficient time to enable the defendant
to defend;
(b) The judgment was obtained by fraud that deprived the losing party
of an adequate opportunity to present its case;
(c) The judgment or the claim for relief on which the judgment is
based is repugnant to the public policy of this state or of the United
States;
(d) The judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive judgment;
(e) The proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an agreement
between the parties under which the dispute in question was to be
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,

(

determined otherwise than by proceedings in that foreign court; .:"
(f) In the case of jurisdiction based only on personal service, the
foreign court was a seriously inconvenient forum for the trial of the action;
(g) The judgment was rendered in circumstances that raise
substantial doubt about the integrity of the rendering court with respect to
the judgment; or
(h) The specific proceeding in the foreign court leading to the
judgment was not compatible with the requirements of due process of
law.
(4) A party resisting recognition of a foreign country judgment has the
burden of establishing that a ground for nonrecognition stated in
subsection (2) or (3) of this section exists.

Emphasis added.
1. The German judgment does not conflict with the California judgment. and
does not impact full faith and credit nor res judicata.
Appellant claims that following Idaho's law regarding foreign cuuhtry judgments
cannot be reconciled with the duty to accord the California Judgment full faith and
credit. (Appellant's Brief, pg. 20). That argument begs the question and is simply
incorrect. Under the statute, a foreign country judgment shall be recognized unless one
of the grounds for non-recognition is established by the person resisting the judgment,
who carries the burden of establishing said ground. Appellants have failed to establish
such a ground. Res JUdicata and Full Faith and Credit do not defeat the new action that
was pursued, in the German courts.
Res judicata and fuff faith and credit are domestic principles of law, designed for
uniform application of Jaw and resolution of disputes within a system Qf government.
Official Comment to I.C. 10-1402. They are not automatically or mechanically applied to
foreign country judgments. Id.

Rather, this case is controlled by the Idaho Uniform Foreign Country Judgment
Recognition Act, I.C.

§ 10-1401, et seq. The Official Comment to I.C. 10-1402

specifically makes the distinction that the concepts of full faith and credit do not apply
directly to foreign country judgments. For example, in Day v. Montana Dept. of Social

and Rehab Services., 900 P.2d 296 (Mont, 1995), the court there held that a trible court
. "
judgment was not subject to full faith and credit, and should be treated With the same
deference show foreign country judgments.
The Appellants argue that the recognizing the German judgment is contrary to
California law, and conflicts with that judgment which is final and conclusive by focusing
on the merger aspects of res judicata, citing a number of California cases. Ulitmately,
the Appellants argue that Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S.

222 (1998)

constituionally requires Idaho to refuse to recognize the German judgment under the
domestic concepts of res judicata and full faith and credit.

Baker, however, is a

domestic case not involving a foreign country judgment, and is soley concerned with the
traditional full faith and credit and res judicata issues inherent in

~oi1lestic

litigation

within the United States. It is not factually or legally on point and does not apply here.
Likewise, Byb/os Bank Europe, S.A., v. Skekerbank Turk Anonym Syrketi, 10
N.Y.3d 243, 885, N.E.2d 191, 855 N'y.S.2d 427 (2008) is not on point factually or
legally, and does not support Mr. Grohmann's arguments. That case involves a case
that conflicted with a prior case from yet another country. Byb/os, 10 N.Y.3d at 248,885
N.E.2d at 194, 855 N.Y.S.2d at 430.
That concern is controlled by the Idaho Uniform Foreign Country Judgment Act,
I.C. 10-1404(d), which states that it is a discretionary ground to not recognize a foreign

R

country's judgment if it conflicts with another final judgment. The District Court below
properly ruled that the German judgment in this case is not in conflicr with the prior
California judgment as was the case in the Byb/os case. Here, the German court
awarded essentially the same result as the former California case to Mr. Markin based
on German law and based on Mr. Grohmann's connections to that country and
ownership of property there. Pentz

v.

Kuppinger, 31 CaI.App.3d, 590, 107 Cal.Rptr. 540

(1973). a California case that is not controlling on this Court, was decided long before
the Idaho Foreign Country Judgment Act was enacted, also does not control. In that
case. a Mexican judgment regarding child support was drastically different from a prior
California result. Pentz, 31 Cal.App.3d at 597, 107 Cal.Rptr. at 545. As discussed
above, such is not the case here.
Moreover, as noted by the Idaho courts. the debt represented by the California
judgment can still be pursued in California by a separate suit on the judgment. It in no
way offends the finality of the California judgment to pursue rights obtained under it, or
the underlying debt represented by it. in a foreign jurisdiction, particularly when it can
still be pursued in California. No authority has been presented suggesting such is the
law.
The Idaho courts have recognized that the California judgment can still be
pursued pursuant to a separate action in California, as discussed in G & R Petroleum
Inc., v. Clements. 127 Idaho 119, 898 P.2d 50 (1995). There, in footnote 4, the court
,

'.

noted that a state may not, under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, refuse to enforce a
judgment of a sister state on the ground that an action on the original claim was barred
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by its own statute of limitations at the time the judgment was rendered in the sister
state.
The court reasoned that an action on a judgment is a new and separate action on
the debt represented by a prior judgment. Therefore, the court reasoned, it would be
constitutionally required to recognize the new judgment so long as enforcement was
sought within six years. Id. at 122. Pursuing his rights in the German courts is likewise a
new action based on the debt represented by the California judgment. Plaintiff pursued
relief and received it under German law. Further, pursuit can still be had in California on
that same judgment, in which case the Idaho courts would be required to recognize the
new judgment. It does not at all offend res judicata or full faith and credit concepts to
allow the pursuit of the debt represented by the California judgment in Germany.
2.

Appellants' other public policy arguments do not create a mandatory or

discretionary reason to refuse to recognize the German judgment under the statute.
Appellants further argue that the judgment or the claim for relief on which the
judgment is based is repugnant to the public policy of this state or of tne United States.
,

Appellants' arguments fail, as they are not contemplated by I.C. § 10-1404(3)(c). As
stated above, I.C. § 10-1404 states that a court of this state shall recognize a foreign
country judgment unless a mandatory reason to not recognize the judgment is shown as
set forth in subsection (2) of that statute, or the court in its discretion finds a
discretionary reason under subsection (3) of that statute. I.C. § 10-1404(4) states that
the party resisting recognition of the foreign country judgment bears the burden of
establishing a ground for nonrecognition in subsection (2) or (3) of the section.

'.'

A

..,

'.~

.'t \

None of the grounds for nonrecognition were shown by Appellants at the
hearings below.
Officar Comment 7 to I.C. § 10-1404 states that the type of fraud that will serve
as a ground for nonrecognition is restricted to "extrinsic" fraud that prevents a litigant
from having an adequate opportunity to present its case, such as deliberately giving
wrong information as to the time and place of hearing. Id. Matters such as false
testimony, or forged documents, etc., constitute "intrinsic" fraud, and do not provide a
basis for nonrecognition. {d.
Official Comment 8 to the statute clearly provides in paragraph 2 of that comment
that the test for finding a violation of public policy is a stringent olle.

Further, a

';.. .:J

difference in the law, even a marked one, is not sufficient to raise a public policy issue.
It is additionally not relevant that the foreign law allows a recovery that the forum state
would not allow. For the purposes of the statute, which was duly enacted by the State
of Idaho, public policy is violated only if enforcement would tend clearly to injure the
public health, morals, or the public confidence in the administration of justice, or would
undermine the sense of security of individual rights or property that any citizen ought to
feel. Hunt v. BP Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd., 492 F.Supp. 885, 901 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
Clearly, seeking to collect a debt owed for many years via a new action in a
foreign country does not injure the health, morals, or public confidence in the
administration of justice. Appellants' arguments do not apply.

•.' .t.

. :

:)

Furthermore, in Germany, Mr. Grohmann was represented by competent counsel
who presented arguments on his behalf. Mr. Grohmann's German counsel had every
opportunity to raise Mr. Grohmann's concerns, and did so. The German Court ruled

against Mr. Grohmann.

Mr. Grohmann was afforded due process in the German

proceedings, specifically including but not limited to notice, and the opportunity to be
heard and argue the issues, as he would have in the a United States court. After Mr.
Grohmann was afforded these rights, the German Court ruled against him.
Dr. Bente, Plaintiff's German attorney, addressed the points raised by Appellants
(R., pp.179-82) and has squarely refuted them, thus controverting the facts as alleged
by Mr. Grohmann. Dr. Bente's affidavit also addresses the other requirements of Idaho
Code § 10-1404, and has established that Plaintiff has met his burden under that
statute. Controverted facts requiring the drawing of inferences from those facts exist in
the record additionally preventing summary judgment. Loomis, 119 Idaho at 436
(citations omitted).
Mr. Grohmann claimed that the German Court was misled, but the German
Court's opinion demonstrates that it considered Mr. Grohmann's points, and simply
ruled against Mr. Grohmann. The Court was not misled. Mr. Grohmann simply lost that
point. As conceded in his pleadings, the high German court declined to review the
point. Mr. Grohmann therefore cannot establishing such a ground for nonrecognition,
even if such facts as alleged constituted a ground under the Act. Therefore, a viable
claim for recognition by this Court of the German judgment against Grohmann has been
presented. That judgment should be recognized under Idaho Code § 10-1404, et seq.
Additionaly, IRCP 60(b) does not controvert, restrict or overrule the Idaho's
Uniform Foreign Country Judgments Recognition Act as argued by Appellants. IRCP
60(b) provides a remedy available by motion, which relief was not pursued below, and is
not preserved for appeal here. The Idaho cases cited by Mr. Grohmann all involve
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litigation at the District Court level that was then appealed. Such is not the case here,
and therefore, IRCP 60(b) does not apply.
The Act, however, was duly enacted by the legislature, and the legislative
comments squarely address the concerns raised by Mr. Grohmann. It is more specific
to this case and must control over the general provisions of IRCP 60(b), which instead
provides for a motion that is not relevant currently to this case. The District Court acted
properly in recognizing the judgment.
Though not argued here by Apellant, and apparently therefore conceded, no
other ground such as a contrary agreement as contemplated by I.C. § 10-1404(3)(e)
and argued by Mr. Grohmann below, or any other ground was establislJ~tf.
The District
.',
,

Court properly found that no such ground existed.
Finally, Mr. Grohmann makes an argument, unsupported by any authority, that
Mr. Markin's efforts to have his German judgment recognized here under the Act is not
the sort of case contemplated or aimed at by the Act. He cites no authority for this
proposition. As such. it should not be considered.
C. Appellants are not entitled to attorneys fees on appeal. and fees and costs. if
any. should be awarded to Respondent.
Appellant Grohmann's arguments for fees on appeal are not well taken, and
therefore fail. First, Mr. Grohmann's appeal should be denied, in which case he will not
be a prevailing party. In that case, Mr. Markin, will be the prevailing pattrand should be
awarded his reasonable fees and costs on appeal under I.C. § 12-120, and IAR 41 if
anyone is awarded fees and costs.

11

Second, this action is essentially a collection action based on a judgment issued
by a German court. It is not at this point an action on a contract as argued by Mr.
Grohmann, and is not based on a commercal transaction as argued by Mr. Grohmann.
Therefore, his cases do not apply. If in fact it is determined that pursuit of recognition of
the German judgment constitutes a commercial transaction, Mr. M~r~ing
should be
.. '.
awarded his fees for having to defend this appeal in his attempt to collect monies owed
him by Mr. Grohmann for years.
Additionally, it is far from frivolous to resist an appeal of a judgment of the District
Court recognizing a foreign country's judgment in favor of the Plaintiff, Mr. Markin. Mr.
Markin was properly awarded said judgment in Germany due to Mr. Grohmann's
connections and real estate ownership there as set forth in the memorandum opinion of
that court. He sought and was granted recognition of that judgment here. Even if this
Court were to overturn the District Court, it would not be appropriate to find resistance to
this appeal to be frivolous and award fees on that basis.
Therefore, it is Mr. Markin's position that fees and costs on atl~Hjasis should be
denied to Mr. Grohmann. If anyone should receive fees on appeal, it should be Mr.
Markin as the prevailing party.

IV
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court properly denied Appe"ants' motions
for summary judgment as concerns Mr. Grohmann, and recognized the German
judgment against him under the Idaho Uniform Foreign Country Judgment Recognition
Act. Mr. Grohmann has presented nothing that suggests that this Court should overturn

1?

the District Court. Plaintiff pursued his rights in Germany which resuited.in a judgment
that is final in that country. Appellant Grohmann was offered and received his due
process rights in compliance with Idaho's statute for recognition of foreign country
judgments. Therefore, the Respondent, Mr. Markin, respectfully requests that this Court
affirm the District Court, deny Mr. Grohmann's request for attorneys fees and costs, and
award reasonable attorneys fees to Mr. Markin as the prevailing party herein.

DATED this

3i2

day of September, 2011.

kt:J;z

STEPHEN D. THOMPSON
Attorney for Appellant

"

,-:";
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
of September, 2011, I served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by causing a copy thereof
to be placed in the U.S. Mail, addressed to:
I

US Mail, Postage Paid
Federal Expre~s~·Mail
Via Facsimile
.
Hand Delivery

Christopher P. Simms
Post Office Box 3123
Ketchum, Idaho 83340
Fax: 208-622-7921

US Mail, Postage Paid
Federal Express Mail
Via Facsimile
Hand Delivery

Richard K. Walker
E.J. Peskind
Walker & Peskind, PLLC
7047 East Greenway Parkway, Suite 155
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Fax: 480-624-2035

~

14

,".

..:

.

